THE CHINA WEEKLY REVIEW

密勒氏評論報

A Weekly Newspaper Established In 1917

December 4, 1948

AMERICAN DILEMMA

AN EDITORIAL

Pengpu: Second Round For Nanking

Mark M. Lu

Renewed Peace Movement

C. Y. W. Meng

Viet Nam's Fight For Freedom

William Johnson

WAR MAP OF CHINA

VOLUME 112 GY12 NUMBER 1

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LETTERS From The People

Comments from readers on current topics are cordially invited: their opinions, however, do not necessarily represent the views of The China Weekly Review.

Flying Generals

To The Editor:

It is only a matter of common sense that national heroes and "ding hao" American "Flying Generals" who were highly praised and most heartily welcome in our war against the Japanese will no longer be great friends of the Chinese if they get into the Civil War. People used to think it right and noble to suffer any loss for the sake of national liberation.

But no Chinese can bear to see his own cities being bombed and his own brothers being slaughtered except those diehards and profiteers who have lost no time in hurrying their wives, concubines and children to America, Hongkong or Taiwan. Maybe they are going to live happily for some time, but a dog's life, White Russian style, will not be too slow in coming.

Shall it be long before Chennault, the king of the tigers, and his boys come to their rescue by taking up the pleasant job of killing more of the Chinese people than the Communists? Life is life; it is precious and to all those with overwhelming ambition, power and wealth I wish to say that this time they will not avoid the hardships and penalties as they did during the last war. And to all the tiger-boys, "Won't you be reasonable and wise enough to remember the English proverb, 'What millions died that Cæser might be great?'"

The Chinese are capable of settling their own affairs and they don't need you. They will not thank you even if you lay down your lives for such a cause on this soil of ours. Just think of that!

MAN IN THE STREET

Shanghai
November 24, 1948

World's Scientists

To The Editor:

A new era of science has opened and it grows day after day. Ever since Americans and Russians discovered or invented such things as artificial snow and rain, anti-old age serum (抗老血清) and the cosmic ray it showed us that man is on the way towards conquering nature. People have even said that we shall be able to soon use atomic energy to drive rocket ships to the moon and we can then enjoy her landscape in the near future. We now see what a happy world we can have!

However, most of the great scientists in the world today have given themselves up entirely to inventing cruel scientific weapons. Nobody has forgotten the atomic bomb, which victimized millions of Japanese.

We Chinese, as well as other people in the world, are menaced by these unjust and cruel scientific inventions. We are fearful of even imagining what a dreadful sight World War III would be. I hope the great world scientists, especially in America will save the people and not become the tools of the ambi-

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tious world statesmen. This is an appeal from the depths of my heart.

CHOU TSING-CHEK

Wukang, Hunan
November 19, 1948

Unsolved Problem

To The Editor:

I will inform you of a surprising incident which occurred in Wan-ting on the fifth of this month.

In the early morning a crowd of peasants gathered in the streets armed with clubs and farming tools. They rushed into houses in which "honorable soldiers" were living and a tragedy commenced. They dragged out the "honorable soldiers," some of whom were still in bed, and clubbed them to death. Town residents kept inside while cries of "strike, strike, put an end to them" were heard a mile around. Every uniformed man was in danger of losing his life. In two hours the riot was over. The peasants dispersed, 18 soldiers were killed and eight severely wounded.

The uprising of the peasants was indeed a surprising event for the Chinese peasant is patient and obedient. They live in fear of those who wear greenish yellow uniforms which they call tiger skin. They do not dare utter a word of complaint at the misbehavior of those soldiers. How then did such an incident occur? A brief review of the behavior of soldiers will answer this question.

They seize people's houses by force and pay little or nothing for goods they buy. Eight soldiers once went to a farm and wished to buy a sheep for which they were willing to pay one Gold Yuan. The poor farmer tried to argue with them but they carried away the sheep and a pig to boot. We may well see how these "honorable soldiers" are honored by the peasants.

Since the bloody incident, many soldiers have entered the town for the purpose of making an inquiry into the matter. The town residents are taking refuge in the countryside, every shop has its doors closed and business is at a standstill.

The soldiers, besides making a thorough search for the criminals, insist upon residing and conducting their business in the town, but the people refuse to return to Wan-Ting until the soldiers leave. So the problem remains unsolved.

D. J. CHOW.

Wan-Ting, Kiangsu
November 8, 1948

All Chinese

To The Editor:

While the eyes of the whole country are focused on the decisive battle of Hsuchow where both Nationalists and Reds are heavily massed, triumphant successes are reported by the Nationalists indicating that Communist casualties had amounted to more than 100,000. This may be true since the withdrawal of Nationalist troops from the Northeast and the abandonment of several large cities caused the military situation to become extremely critical. Generalissimo Chiang, alarmed by the unexpected turn of events, was determined to win the battle of Hsuchow at any cost. He sent his best equipped and well-trained troops into a life and death struggle with the bandits. Although up to the present we have had no information concerning these forces, it must be assumed that Nationalist casualties could not be much less than those inflicted on the Reds. So it can be seen that the hold of Hsuchow by the Nanking government is really a consummate shedding of the blood of poor Chinese whose families are suffering under the pressure of the times.

The KMT and the CP are engaged in a bloody and fratricidal war. Let us behold the whole picture. The miserable and the suffering are precisely those whom both governments are striving to protect. But have we seen a single soldier bound for the front who was the son of an official? Why then should only the poor and the weak be used as tools for political power and pay for it with their lives?

We must not let this iniquity exist any longer. We should challenge the ill influence of those who want us to do slaughter among ourselves and state the fact that we are every one of us Chinese.

WE CHUNG-SAN.

Changsha, Hunan
November 18, 1948

Critical Stage

To The Editor:

The civil war has reached a critical situation since Hsuchow was besieged by Communist troops. Aerial fleets have been dispatched to the front from Nanking to prevent the Reds from coming closer. During the bombings, it is my belief that a large number of fine people were killed.

Newspapers reported yesterday that General Chennault offered the service of his "Flying Tigers" to the Chinese Government. The very thought of this presents a terrible picture to me. I beg him to realize that this is a Chinese war and that no foreign interpolater is required for the purpose of bombing not only communists, but many innocent farmers. Does he want to be an executioner?

During the time that our government asked the United States Army to help in their fight against communism, a student of the National Central University fearlessly appealed to every student to rise in protestation of such a move.

In the same way, the traitor Wu San Kwei turned to the Manchu government when the Ming Dynasty was on the verge of falling. This is the sad relic left to us. Let us pray therefore that there shall not be a second Wu San Kwei.

TIEN CHEH JIUN.

Nanking
November 21, 1948

Japanese Adviser

To The Editor:

I have read the article entitled, "Dr. Soong Tze-wen, Administrater in Kwangtung For One Year" (see *The Observer*, volume one, number 10). I wish to translate one paragraph of this article as follows:

"To develop the economic power of South China and help the military situation in the north is the chief object of Dr. Soong. He went there with a great number of technical advisers, many of them receiving high salaries in terms of US dollars and supplied with beautiful houses and cars. Horiuchi or Chow-nei Kang-chung, (堀內干城) is one adviser. He is a Japanese and during the war of resistance he was a commander of the economic administration in control of central China where he used his position to look into conditions for the Japanese army".....

It is an ironical fact that he is our enemy yet he now enjoys a special position in our land. I am sure that he is continuing his secret plots against our country and I don't know why Dr. Soong has taken him on as an adviser.

Some people may say that we must get rid of the feeling of race and give him a chance. Yes, we can let our enemy know that many Chinese people were sacrificed due to his invasion. Why then, don't we get rid of our feeling of partisanship and let Mr. Mao Tzu-

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tung help govern China? Yes, I understand the traditional Chinese concept, "give the matter to the neighbor, not to the servant." But we must know that our enemy is our enemy and not our neighbor.

Finally, I wish to say that Dr. Soong has wasted much money to give a Japanese such a position. It could have furnished the pay of 10-20 college professors or made up the allowance of hundreds of students.

NON-PARTISAN STUDENT.

Wusih, Kiangsu
November 16, 1948

Real Issue

To The Editor:

In your excellent editorial "Modern Espionage" in the November 20 issue of the *Review* you have thrown some light on an understanding of the Communist movement which should be reckoned with as a "force" now engaged in the remolding of China.

While agreeing with most of what you have to say, I was somewhat disappointed to see that you scarcely touched upon the real issue in the present Kuomintang-Communist struggle, or any political struggle. As far as I know, any dispute among different political parties, resulting in actual armed conflict can only be studied by comparing their political aims. It is unfortunately the case that from time to time it becomes necessary for the ill-treated majority to become aware of the exploiting nature of the social system and thus it is compelled to direct its attention towards effecting some means by which the malpractices and wrongdoings of the corrupted officialdom be made impossible. The emergence of any revolutionary party throughout history can be understood only in this light, and this alone can justify the upheavals and insurrections of the suppressed against their tyrants, against the exploiting class and against an unfair social system.

Of course, the political aims of any party is not to be understood by what is claimed by its propaganda organs but by what its record reveals. We are all quite sufficiently acquainted with the past history of the Kuomintang, hence nor further comment except to remark that the top officials are no less realistic than the Communists when state affairs are not concerned. What the Communists are remains to be seen. But there are indications that they more or less have won the confidence of the people under their control, although the properteid class greatly fears losing its widespread privileges. I am inclined to think that your criticism of the two major parties in China would be more fair and illuminating if due consideration had been given this point.

Concerning what you said about the future relations between the two countries on either shore of the Pacific even should the present government be replaced, I can only agree with your realistic manner of looking at things and I believe this will be ours too. However, it is unrealistic to assume that your opinion, realistic as it may be, will be shared by all of your countrymen, while there are Judds, Bullitts and Chennaults. Recent press reports reveal that Mr. Chennault, whom one of my friends told me has publically told his men that he has come here to help the National Government, goes so far as to have proposed the reorganization of the Flying Tigers to bolster the Kuomintang Air Force and to favor the bombing of the industrialized Northeastern provinces. The latter, meant to menace the Communists, would harm all of China if we bear in mind what a role these provinces could play in the modernization of China once the Civil War is over.

It was also interesting to note what you said about the development of modern espionage from the days of false whiskers, secret radios, daggers, etc. to the present state of a rather dull confining occupation carried out mostly by a bunch of clerks. Being completely a layman in such matters I am not qualified to say very much but it seems to me unlikely that the old methods of espionage would be completely given up for the new ones if they still promise to dig up valuable information. However, this is only a minor point and we should not be misled and disregard the more important political issues with which the whole world seems to be involved.

APPEAL TO REASON.

Shanghai
November 27, 1948

English Standard

To The Editor:

Let me express my hearty gratitude to your valuable magazine which has largely improved my English standards and given me so much current information that everyone is surprised at my sudden progress. Indeed it is the *Review* that helped me to succeed in passing the English course in the college entrance examination this year, though I am but a second grade senior student. I have studied in Northwest University at Sian for weeks now and can enjoy a subsistance allowance because my native town is besieged by the Reds. Many of my chums pay high tribute to my success. "Think of the fountain when drinking," goes the Chinese proverb. Your paper is just the "fountain" from which I dig up my water to "drink." Therefore, whenever anyone asks me how to improve his English, this is my stock answer, "Read the *Review*."

C. C. Y.

Sian, Shensi
November 16, 1948.

Tension Continues

To The Editor:

The battle for Hsuchow was concluded by midnight of November 18, and at the same time Suhsien's siege was also lifted, Militarily, it seems as if the victory should ease the tension but the terrible terror continues to hang over us.

Last evening, when I was in Nanking, I witnessed many trucks loading the baggage and families of high-ranking officials at 11:50, after the curfew under martial law. This event may account for the "danger" which is about to come over Nanking. It was also being rumored throughout the city that Canton would be the capital in the event the Government evacuates from Nanking. If this is really so then the victory at Hsuchow is only a "reflective light of death." Our Government would then be aware that it is impossible to keep the capital.

At this unprecedented critical moment, these selfish and timid officials instead of discussing and managing national affairs and instead of saving the nation from the CP are engaged in personal interests and have placed physical safety above the nation's fate. These corrupt officials who have squeezed the people and enriched themselves are forsaking their masters, the people, and are preparing to flee.

The Chinese people are the masters of China and they must prevent our servants from escaping.

HSU SHIH-CHEN

National Honan University, Soochow
November 22, 1948

Lesser Evil

To The Editor:

There is no doubt that the results of the US elections came as a great surprise to everyone. The influence of Mr. Thomas Dewey's "propaganda blitz" made it seem certain that Dewey was to be the next President of the United States.

Why did the Americans vote for Truman? The following is my simple explanation. As a popular Chinese proverb goes, "Of two evils, choose the lesser." America chose Truman as the lesser evil. Dewey was one of the strongest leaders of the "Anti-USSR" group. He warned the people to prepare for a third world war. Although Truman is also an "anti-USSR" knight, he is far less forceful than Dewey. That is why the majority of peace-loving Americans chose Truman. One may ask, "Why then did they not vote for Wallace?" This is because Wallace and his party did not have strong supporters of their policy. For this reason, many voters while sympathizing with Wallace, voted for Truman.

FAN KONG.

Wuchang, Hupeh
November 15, 1948

Plea For Justice

To The Editor:

I wish to thank you for your kindness in publishing the letter regarding my case in your issue of October 30, and I can assure you that if I am released from jail I will come to thank you personally.

I believe and hope that justice will be done to me because I am honestly not guilty. Now I suffer and wait in silence, and pray for help. My present hardships do not affect my faith in justice, and though I am hungry, cold and sick, I have not lost courage. By the publication of my letters, I am sure that my plea for justice will come to someone's attention and be heeded.

JACQUES MATIATOS.

Shanghai
November 20, 1948.

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American Dilemma

THERE has been much speculation recently about America's China policy. Since things obviously are reaching a critical turn here, various interested parties have been issuing statements and making declarations to the effect that it is time for the United States to clarify its stand regarding this country.

So far, neither President Truman nor Secretary Marshall has appeared anxious to come forth with a major policy statement. They have seemed content with making brief comments to the effect that the China situation is being studied or that problems arising from the sudden spread of the Civil War are being considered. Observers and partisans, from the extreme right to the extreme left, are irritated. Even many who hold no particular brief for either right or left feel that America should be "doing something" at this critical period.

One reason for the lack of a policy statement, we believe, is that both Truman and Marshall are exploring the China "problem" carefully, trying to make up their minds as how best to proceed. Marshall, who is the Truman administration's chief expert on China, undoubtedly is under terrific pressure from all sides. It is our guess that so far no final decision has been made, unless, of course, it has been agreed to do nothing. Another few weeks should give us the answer to this, since if Washington makes up its mind to act sharply one way or the other (jump in with both feet or get out), action cannot be long delayed.

Although the proponents of immediate aid to the Nationalists feel that the question is simple and that there should be no delay in putting such a policy into action, we feel that the problem is much more complex and requires considerable thought. We also believe that those who would have the United States pull out of China and bury its head in the Western Pacific also overlook many aspects of the China situation.

However, exponents of these two extreme measures include some very strong groups and some important and extremely vocal individuals who naturally will not rest and who will not let the Washington administration rest either. Foremost among the groups which would involve the United States actively in China's internal affairs, we believe, is the US Navy. While Consul-General Cabot has been urging Americans in the Shanghai area to leave China as quickly as possible, Vice-Admiral Badger, apparently acting upon an entirely different set of instructions from Washington, has been beating the drum of American nationalism, declaring loudly that US Marines are ready for the call to come and protect American nationals and their property.

At times we are inclined to regard the Navy's tears of solicitude over us civilian Americans as something less than touching. Such a feeling is heightened when we understand on good authority that the American Army is all for getting the hell out of China. Why should one branch of the American armed forces be so concerned over American civilians and their interests here at the same time as another branch is taking a hands-off attitude? The answer lies, we think, in the differing concepts of world strategy held by the two branches of the service.

The Navy, whose business it is to keep the sea lanes open in time of war so that American ships carrying men and supplies can be ferried to battlefronts abroad, feels that it is imperative to keep China's coast in the hands of a "friendly" government. This is important for two reasons. First and foremost it prevents their use by a potential enemy, in this case Russia, which could make good use of China's coastal areas for submarine and airplane bases. Second, if the coast is held by a friendly government, then the United States Navy itself can use the port facilities.

The Navy concept, undoubtedly reasonable from a strictly strategic point of view, fails, however, to take into consideration many important factors. First, is the cost. Would the cost of maintaining such a friendly government in control of China's coasts be worth the outlay? Conceivably, it might be cheaper if and when war starts, to come in and take the coasts by military means, rather than spend huge sums yearly as a form of insurance. Another point which the Navy seems to overlook is the internal political situation in China. We may be pardoned for repeating an old saying since it is still quite pertinent: The Communists are not winning the war; the Nationalists are losing it. Attempts to bolster a Government which has shown itself particularly unreceptive to suggestions of economic and political reform designed to make it more popular with the people it governs seems to us a dubious bet.

Still another consideration, we think, is the question of whether or not war with Russia is inevitable. Naturally it is the duty of the American armed forces to make plans for and be prepared for all contingencies. However, somewhere a line must be drawn between what constitutes reasonable preparation for defense and what marks an aggressive act. As the world has shrunk in size, we have constantly been told how our borders must be placed further and further away. Yesterday it was the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Today it is the

BATTLE OF NOISE



This cartoon shows the United States Information Service's Voice of America receiving much needed aid from the American Congress in its battle to keep ahead of Russia in the world-wide battle of words.

Rhine River and the China coast. Following this type of thinking to its illogical conclusion, we might say that tomorrow they will be along the Volga and the Yellow Rivers. What we will do the following day when our armies and navies and airforces are facing each other across the Amur we can't imagine! To be perfectly serious, though, the United States simply cannot talk of extending its strategic frontiers a few thousand miles across the world without running into trouble with the people inhabiting these far away places. Sooner or later, if we allow our grand strategists to formulate our foreign policy in terms of strategic frontiers, we are going to be considered first rate aggressors and get into trouble.

So much for the Navy. The Army, we understand, having had considerably more experience in China and with the present Chinese Government than the Navy, has reached the conclusion that the United States is probably not strong enough to keep the present Government in power unless there are drastic reforms made in Nanking. So far, there is little evidence of such reforms.

The views of the American State Department are well known. Several warnings have been issued to American civilians in this country advising them that an evacuation may become necessary in the future and that they would do well to consider leaving now while transportation is relatively easy to obtain. In fact the State Department has arranged for some accommodations on government transports.

Meanwhile, the Embassy is planning to leave US consular personnel behind in many places as the Reds advance. Ostensibly, this plan—already carried out in Mukden—is to provide consular protection, for whatever it is worth, in "enemy" occupied regions for American nationals and property overrun by the Reds. However, it is obvious that the Embassy desires to make contact with the Chinese Reds. This is only natural since the American Government (at least the civilian part of it) hopes to maintain relations with China, no matter what kind of Government.

Also, in the event of a Communist victory in China and eventual American recognition—a possibility which must not be overlooked—the State Department would desire to maintain consulates in as many places as possible. It will be much simpler to maintain existing consulates than to apply for permission to reestablish old ones. Even if recognition should not come or if it should prove impossible to work with the Reds, the consulates could easily be withdrawn later.

In addition to the aims of the Navy, Army and State Department, we must consider the various American private groups. Perhaps the most important private group is made up of the various Christian missionary institutions. While the Catholics have had a particularly tough time at the hands of the Chinese Reds on several occasions, it now appears that some Catholic organizations have made tentative plans to try to stick it out under the Reds, providing, of course, that the Reds come at all. Even more Protestant church organizations are planning to stay put. Many are planning to leave male volunteers behind to negotiate with the Reds and to explore the possibilities of continuing missionary work in Communist controlled areas.

Another important group which also is quite capable of bringing its share of pressure to bear upon the policy framers in Washington is the American business community living in China. Some of these people have actual business or industrial establishments in this country, while the vast majority are engaged in the import or export trade or related activities, such as banking and insurance. The American business community, we are told, would like to stay on and continue its activities if it is possible.

Opinion among the individual members of the mission and business communities is of course divided. Some are entirely non-political and the present conflict affects them only because of the violence. Others, however, are highly political and feel strongly about the Kuomintang and the Communists, expressing themselves freely. By and large, their memberships, though, could be considered nominally anti-communist since communism is not exactly compatible with Christianity or capitalism. However, despite this natural tendency toward opposition on the part of the missionaries and businessmen, large numbers definitely are prepared to make an attempt to function under a Communist regime if they can do so.

Only time will give them an answer, although many profess to see the answer or an indication of the answer every now and then. Immediately after the fall of Tsinan and again after the fall of Mukden, many were enthusiastic, considering the first reports of good treatment of foreigners and their enterprises as hopeful signs. Since then, though, there have been two strong statements by Mao Tze-tung, Chinese Communist leader, who had a few unpleasant things to say about American imperialism. Also, we are now reading stories, the origin of which is not exactly clear, about how nuns are being raped, children separated from parents, etc. These stories and Mao's speeches have dampened the hopes of many missionaries and businessmen. However, the fact remains that if it is possible, these two groups will attempt to stay and carry on. Their influence in Washington is not inconsiderable.

These are some of the interests which Secretary Marshall, President Truman and other policy framers must consider. Obviously the overall welfare of the United States will be considered first. America's prestige in the world must be considered. The traditional friendship of the American people for the Chinese people over the years must be considered. The dictates of National defense, world power politics, American business interests, American Christian and cultural interests—a host of things—must be reviewed.

In addition to all these considerations, which involve American interests, there is the question of China's interests. This point, we are afraid, may not get the consideration it should, since other nations usually view their own needs first and the United States, although wealthy and powerful enough to ignore its own narrowest interests at times, is actually governed by pretty much the same instincts as most other countries. However, the internal facts in China cannot be overlooked, when the President and his advisors discuss the China situation, although some of the special groups, such as the American Navy or particular individuals such as Congressman Judd, Businessman Kohlberg, or Lame Duck Envoy Bullitt, may ignore them. Marshall knows as well as anyone else the sorry story of American attempts to aid the Nationalist Government since VJ Day. As we have pointed out before, the blame cannot be placed entirely upon the Nationalists, but at the same time it must be recognized that precious little use has been made of the American aid thus far given China.

Nanking is now urgently requesting still more aid. Is there any guarantee that new aid, unless administered directly by an American organization which would resemble a miniature government in China, would be of any more use than the help already dispensed? Is it not more likely to assume that with the unbelievable demoralization now apparent in Government military and civilian ranks that additional aid will be used even less effectively than in the past? We think that those sections of the American Government which have had experience with past aid have decided that the only method of making aid effective in this country is to have the administration controlled completely by foreigners. Proof of this seems to be in the increased control Americans retained over the China Relief Mission activities, as compared with UNRRA and again with ECA, which is even more tightly controlled.

Obviously the existence of such an aid organization must be most unpleasant to the Chinese Government and people, since it in fact is an insult to their intelligence and integrity. When the UNRRA program was set up at the end of the war, China firmly insisted upon retaining complete control of the program and did, with the result that so many sticky fingers were dipped into the till that the very name of the organization became almost synonomous with scandal. Today, Nanking seems to have swallowed its pride and is willing to take aid on terms dictated by the United States. Could not this be considered the action of a government which, because of its incompetence, has become so weak that it will agree to anything as long as it gets another handout?

Foreign supporters formerly used to deny the many accusations hurled both by critics and neutral observers. Today it is no longer possible to deny these shortcomings. Men like Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer, neither of whom can be suspected of being on Moscow's payroll, have seen and pointed out the faults of Nanking. Die-hard supporters now admit the faults but say they are excusable because they result from the weakened condition of the Central Government, which is a direct result of attack by Moscow's running dogs, the Chinese Communists. It is now claimed that in addition to an ideology, Moscow gives political and military training to Chinese Reds and aided the Communists in getting surrendered Japanese arms.

Even if we accept all this as being true, we must not forget that Nationalist China has had a great deal more aid than the Russians have been capable of giving the Chinese Reds. Look at the thousands of Chinese trained in American schools, both in China and America. Look at the military and economic aid brought to China by the US. The plain fact remains that the Nationalist Government has come to its present critical pass because of its own inherent weaknesses and that it has no one to blame but itself.

Any way Washington looks at it, increased American involvement entails a risk, the danger of which must be carefully calculated. Past aid has failed. If more aid is given, is there any assurance that it will succeed? On the other hand, what would happen if the US pulled up stakes and went home? This, we think, would be an invitation to trouble. It would be a loss of prestige, although admittedly it is difficult to see how it would be possible to lose more prestige than has already been lost. Also, it would amount to throwing China into the arms of Russia, presupposing, of course, an eventual Chinese Communist victory.

We personally do not favor communism and we think its spread should be resisted. However, we don't think it can be done with bombs and bullets. It can be done by making our own democracy work a great deal better than it is

now doing. We have solved the question of political freedom and the dignity of the individual, but we have yet to solve the economic problem of the average man. Our form of democracy must be extended much further into the economic field than it is now. We have a Democratic-controlled Congress which can do this if it will. Such action will do more to raise America's prestige abroad—where the question of bread is the foremost one—than any number of improved atomic bombs stockpiled during the next four years.

In China we think we should follow a policy of non-intervention militarily. We have already aided the Kuomintang tremendously. If it can't make the grade now, it never will. There is also a good chance that when the boys in Nanking realize that the sugar from abroad is cut off, they may bestir themselves a bit and begin liquidating some of their own tremendous personal fortunes and holdings both here and abroad. Promises of aid have not made them any less corrupt or any more efficient. Perhaps stoppage of aid will.

Meanwhile, we think aid to the Chinese people should be continued. Reconstruction work on the Hangchow Sea Wall, for instance, should be completed, regardless of how the Civil War goes. Other worthwhile projects should be initiated and current ones continued. This, of course, presents a difficult problem in that it may prove impossible to continue work in areas engulfed by the fighting. However, it should be made clear to all that the American aid of the future is from the American people to the Chinese people, not from the American Government to any particular regime which happens to control the reins in China at any particular time.

By this we do not advocate the opening of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists, since that would be impossible so long as we still maintain such relations with the Nationalists. We should keep aid programs going in areas where they now exist and if these regions are overrun by the Reds, then we should attempt to keep them in operation. We should leave our consulates where they are, regardless of whether or not such cities are occupied by Reds or reoccupied by the Nationalists.

It is a little late for us to try to play the role of impartial benefactor in this country since we have already rolled up a sizable record as number one supporter of the Kuomintang, but we think we should make the attempt. Our interest should be in the Chinese people and not in any governments which they may or may not have from to time. Such a policy is the only one, we believe, which will ensure continued good relations between our two peoples, which, after all, is what we desire. We may not be able to prevent China from going Communist, but we think we can not only prevent China from becoming an enemy, but can keep her a good friend, by aiding her in those fields where she really needs help. Such aid will certainly not be charity. It will repay itself both economically and culturally.

25 Years Ago in *The China Weekly Review*

Official Life

December 1, 1923

A young man has to climb by slow degrees always placating those above and defending himself from the attacks of those below. If he breaks with the system, and adheres rigidly to an honest policy, he is likely to be looked upon with suspicion by those in authority higher up and with jealousy and dislike from those lower down. He will please no one in power and will stand little success in bucking the system. In other words a young man entering upon political life is faced by the dilemma of complacent obedience to the system he finds, in which case he must lose his own honor and aid in the continuance of the old system indefinitely.

* * *

Opium Traffic

Another story of the amazing extent of the opium traffic in northwest China comes from a foreign businessman in Tientsin who recently reached Peking after a tedious journey of many days from Lanchow. On making inquiry for a cart at Lanchow, of which there were plenty, he was told that if he was willing to carry with him in the cart a load of opium the price of the cart would be the normal rate of a tael (about 70 American cents) a day, but if he wanted a cart for the exclusive use of himself and his baggage—chiefly his food and his bedroll—the price would be $48 a day. At this rate he would have more than paid the value of the cart and horses on the journey from Lanchow to Ninghsia. Since he was unwilling to engage in the opium traffic he was compelled to pay the exorbitant price.

10 Years Ago In *The China Weekly Review*

Rush To Hongkong

December 3, 1938

This week continued to furnish dramatic scenes in the Sino-Japanese war, as Japanese forces on November 25 smashed into the South China town of Shumchun, on the Chinese side of the New Territories boundary, bringing the cannons of war to the very back door of Hongkong.

As the war raged, 100,000 refugees began a mad scramble to find a haven in British territory. The border bridge was guarded by Indian constables, but the refugees constructed inprovised pontoon bridges from sampans, and streamed across the Shumchun River, which forms a natural boundary at that point. At the height of the panic, the Governor of Hongkong, Sir Geoffrey Northcote, arrived at Shumchun and, seeing the pitiful plight of the weeping and wailing refugees, ordered the bridge to be opened.

Thousands of Chinese immediately rushed across, milling hither and thither. Hundreds lost their children and relatives in a frantic rush for sanctuary. Thousands of them climbed through barbed wire, while others waded and swam across the river at many points. The paddy fields along the border were crowded with such numbers that it looked as though they were swarming with myriads of ants.

* * *

Japanese In Nanking

The most alarming aspect of the growing number of Japanese in Nanking is the seizure of Chinese business and residential property. These confiscations are under the direction of the Imperial Army, the military police and the Special Service Section of the army.

The seizure of property is carried out with great simplicity. The Japanese prospector arrives in Nanking, picks out a suitable shop and then informs either one of the three branches of the army that the place is to his liking. The transfer of the property from Chinese ownership to Japanese is carried out in short order. Most of the shops so transferred are immediately transformed into opium dens.

Pengpu: Second Round For Nanking

Mark M. Lu

Nanking, November 26.

WITH the development of the showdown battle raging in the vicinity of Hsuchow, which may very well decide the ultimate fate of the Nationalist Government, Pengpu, the rail hub of the Tsinpu and Huainan railway line in northern Anhwei, holds a most paramount position. Pengpu is the front guard of the Nationalist hold on their capital at Nanking, as well as the life line in the process of serving as a supply center to Hsuchow. Should Pengpu fall before the Communists, Nanking would be shaken to the core and Hsuchow would most likely be isolated and subjected to the same fate which befell Mukden and Changchun in Manchuria.

Nine years ago, Pengpu was a small-sized city with a population of less than 50,000. Today, the city has grown to a size of 300,000 people. Modern roads run through the center of the city and foreign style buildings can be seen everywhere. All the former matsheds have disappeared. As far as places of amusement are concerned, there are about 300 houses of prostitution and three big movies and theaters. Neon lights are seen blazing throughout the city at night in the various shops and stores. One who might have visited Pengpu five years ago would be greatly surprised at the rapid development and prosperity today.

Great Change In Population

In the past few months and especially in the last few weeks, Pengpu has been subject to one great change which is not quite normal. Upon traveling about the city today, it is soon seen that almost 80-90 percent of the people are either uniformed men, refugees or peddlers. Moreover, refugee students can be seen everywhere, carrying their battered belongings with them and looking desperately to the townspeople for some sort of relief. According to one report, 60 percent of the people in Pengpu are military personnel, 30 percent are refugees, while the remaining 10 percent comprise the local residents.

The railway station is constantly jammed and overflowing with both civilian and military people trying to board the trains. Military trains are quite frequent while ordinary would-be passengers far exceed the number of passenger trains. It is quite usual for a passenger train to be forced to wait for five or six hours in order to allow military trains to run on schedule. When a passenger train does pull into the station a great struggle ensues as soldiers and those who have no tickets are usually successful in getting into seats while many ticket-holders lose out in the battle for a place.

The guards supposed to maintain order never dare to check the military personnel but usually confine their actions to the destitute refugees. However, these people often warn the guards, with a deep sigh, "Brethren, you shall soon be turned into refugees like us." Upon hearing the pitiful voices, the guards often lose their enthusiasm for stopping them and instead crouch down in a sunny corner of the platform and have a nap.

Rumors Rampant

When walking downtown, one can usually hear various self-styled analyzers picking the military situation apart. These observers frequently are not adverse to making remarks such as, "The Communist bandits are now converging on the perimeters of the city and will soon begin their attack on the city itself in an effort to isolate Hsuchow."

In an effort to cope with the critical situation, the local military authorities have issued statements to the city's populace urging them not to believe or circulate rumors. They have also deemed rumor spreaders subject to punishment, but to little avail for that would be an impossibility in view of the fact that a serious enforcement of such an edict would necessitate locking up most of the town. The curfew is imposed early in the evening and all citizens have been instructed to always carry their resident certificates to avoid being arrested or exiled from the city. Most of the streets are lined with some sort of fortifications, all of which makes the town seem somewhat like besieged Taiyuan.

One of the most interesting products of the entire situation is that with the Communists drawing nearer many of the local merchants privately make deals with the other side. Most of the goods sold to the Communists are gasoline and spare parts for trucks. Most of the goods brought in are rice and other foods. When asked why they run the risk of trading with the Communists, they reply, "We have to live. How else can we get enough food to eat?"

The residents of Pengpu are accustomed to a confused situation and feel that everything depends on fate. Recently, a stretch of the southern section of the Tsinpu Railway, in the vicinity of Mingkuang, was demolished by the Communists, and resulted in interrupting communications between Nanking and Pengpu. Upon hearing this news, many Pengpu citizens failed to show much concern or excitement, but somewhat wearily remarked, "Let it be demolished."

* * *

IMMEDIATELY after the fall of Mukden and the loss of Manchuria it was Hsuchow which felt the full weight of the pens of most military prognosticators as the Communists opened their campaign for Nanking. Hsuchow came to be known as "the key," "the front door," "the gateway," or "the pivot." However, in view of the present state of affairs in the battle for Nanking and the acknowledged importance of Pengpu today, it might be well to avoid two or three-worded cliches and merely review the campaign thus far with an eye to possible future strategy.

Chen Yi Moves South

Communist General Chen Yi, after taking Tsinan, moved south and stayed with his army while it was being regrouped in southern Shantung. In order to meet the Communist attack, General Liu Chih, Commander-in-Chief of Bandit Suppression in eastern China, had formed the so-called "Cross Battlefield," which means taking Hsuchow as the center with the flanks of the juncture of the Tsinpu and Lunghai Railways as the defense lines.

General Chiu Ching-chuan, Commander of the 5th Army, garrisoned at Tangshan and Huangkow on the left wing; General Huang Pai-tao, Commander of the 25th Army, was stationed at Tancheng and Sinan on the right wing, while Major-General Chiang Wei-kuo, the Generalissimo's son and Commander of the mechanized unit, held Lincheng and Hanchuang on the front line. General Liu Chih had frequently boasted that his battlefield was a "death trap" in which General Chen Yi and his army would be completely annihilated as soon as they initiated the offensive against Hsuchow.

On the Communist side, General Chen Yi used a pincer attack in assaulting Hsuchow. Generals Liu Po-cheng and Chen Keng were on the right flank and Chen Yi himself on the right wing. Generally speaking, each side possessed about 500,000 men. However, as Hsuchow is near Nanking, the Nationalists have more transportation and supply facilities.

On the night of November 5, the spearheads of both sides contacted at Lincheng on the front line. All-out fighting broke out on November 8. On November 10, the Nationalists retreated from Tancheng and Sinan in the east, from Tangshan and Huangkow in the west, and from Lincheng and Hanchuang in the north. It appeared that they wanted to shorten their defense lines. On November 12, it was officially announced by the Nationalists that General Huang Pao-tao had won a sweeping victory at Nienchuang, less than 100 li east of Hsuchow, and inflicted tremendous casualties on the Communists. Later, Suhsien, a strategic town on the Tsinpu Railway and less than 45 miles south of Hsuchow, was captured by Liu Po-cheng, noted Communist "one-eyed dragon" general. As a consequence, rail communications between Nanking and Hsuchow were cut off. Furthermore,



The above map valid as of a week ago, shows the relative positions of the Nationalists and Communists in the two main theaters of operation. Top map shows the thin Nationalist corridor still held by General Fu Tso-yi, as well as surrounded Taiyuan. Lower map indicates positions of contending armies around Pengpu, as well as that city's relationship to Nanking and Shanghai.

traffic between Pengpu and Nanking has also been interrupted by the Communists from time to time. On November 25, the National Defense Ministry issued a communique, stating that the fighting center had moved south into central Anhwei. It indicated that Hsuchow was isolated. At the same time, it was reported that more than 10,000 Communists made their appearance at Changpuling, about 75 miles north of Pukow, in an attempt to demolish the Tsinpu Railway. Judging from the present trend, since the Communists isolated Hsuchow in the first round, they will attempt to capture Pengpu in the second round.

Looking at the region north of the Yangtze River on a map, one finds that the Nationalists appear to have erected one defense line going from Huaiyin in northern Kiangsu southward along the Grand Canal to Yangchow, and another going from the same place eastward along the Huai River, through Pengpu to Hofei. Reviewing the war situation, it is found that General Chen Yi, after capturing Huaiyin, will smash the defense line of the Nationalists along the Grand Canal, and approach Yangchow, thus crossing the Yangtze River at Chenkiang. Generals Liu Po-cheng and Chen Keng, after isolating or taking Pengpu and Hofei, will push south along the Tsinpu line to Pukow so as to threaten Nanking, and drive directly to Chaoho in order to cross the Yangtze River at Wuhu. Before crossing the river, the Communists must conduct a big battle to annihilate the Nationalist troops in order to diminish the menace at their rear.

"Local Communists" Active

In Chekiang and southern Anhwei, so-called "local Communists" have been rampant during the past 10 years. They have laid down a good foundation for the Communists to use in crossing the Yangtze River.

In southern Anhwei, there are 23 hsien or districts. Although the Nationalists still hold all the hsien cities, Communist influence has prevailed for a long time in the country. According to an official estimate, the number of Communists in southern Anhwei is about 4,000—half of whom are equipped with rifles and machine guns. As a matter of fact, the Communists total two or three times this number. It is also stated that the fighting power of the Communists is lower than that of the regular army but higher than that of the local troops. The Communists call themselves the "People's Liberation Army of the Chekiang-Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi Border." Long ago they began to issue propaganda to welcome General Liu Po-cheng across the Yangtze River.

Prior to the Sino-Japanese war, the Communists entered Chekiang and were active. At present, they have established their strongholds in the Szeming and Kwaichi Mountains in eastern Chekiang, and at Tienmu Mountain and Taihu Lake in western Chekiang. They have a strict organization with no less than 10,000 men, equipped with modern weapons. They openly collect taxes from the people, and protect their ships between northern Kiangsu and Chekiang, through their "Sea Defense Headquarters." It may be recalled that in June of this year, the Central Government mobilized land, sea and air forces to suppress them.

Should the battle north of the Yangtze River arrive at a definite stage, and the time be ripe for Generals Chen Yi, Liu Po-cheng and Chen Keng to cross the Yangtze River, it is possible the local Communists in Chekiang will cut off the Hangchow-Shanghai and Shanghai-Nanking Railways. They will then join the Communists in southern Anhwei in disturbing all the cities in the vicinities of Nanking and Shanghai so as to reinforce General Chen Yi's crossing of the Yangtze River at Chenkiang, and Chen Keng's and Liu Po-cheng's crossing at Wuhu.

This may be the reason why the Central Government has recently imposed martial law within the area, from Hangchow in the south to Pengpu in the north, and from Shanghai in the east to Anching in the west.

It was also reasonable for the American Embassy to issue a notification on November 5 advising all Americans to evacuate Nanking and its vicinity on the grounds that river, land and sea communications might be interrupted at any time because of the drastic military developments to the north.

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THE RENEWED PEACE MOVEMENT IN CHINA

C. Y. W. Meng

WHILE many rich people in Nanking and Shanghai have already left, or are leaving, with or without their families, for Canton, Hongkong and even for the United States, there are other Chinese who act and think differently. They put national interest far above their own. They are not running here and there to obtain an air or steamship accommodation, but they are working for peace in China. Their belief that the first and most important step is to save the nation from the devastation and destruction caused by the present conflict, once realized, will save our nation, our homes and our lives. This explains the origin as well as the reason for the present peace movement which is now spreading in China.

In my last article "Don't Spike Peace Talks!" I summarized some editorials and articles on peace talks published in leading independent Chinese magazines in order to show the present popular Chinese sentiment for peace. Also included were parts of the Nanking professors' two open appeals for peace, one addressed to President Chiang Kai-shek and the other to Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party. (See *The Review*, November 20, 1948.)

In an editorial in the form of an open letter to its readers, *The University Review* of November 16 stated that the peace movement has now gained wide approval from the people. Within one day, no less than 20,000 copies of *The University Review* which contained the Nanking professors' two appeals were sold. This is something unusual in China. In addition, the editor of the same journal has so far received many letters from readers, expressing their ardent hope for peace in China.

Secret Trip To Nanking

However, before the publication of these open letters for peace, General Chang Chih-chung, generally known as a general who stands for democracy in China and who once worked with George C. Marshall and Chou En-lai on the powerful three-man committee steering the Kuomintang-Communist peace negotiations, made a secret trip to Nanking on November 4, arriving there at 3:30 p.m. His trip had been kept so secret that not even the people in his residence in Nanking knew anything about his arrival. Gendarmes on duty at the Nanking airdrome, being ignorant that the passenger was General Chang Chih-chung, attempted to search him when he alighted from the plane.

He arrived at the national capital at the same time that General Fu Tso-yi, Commander-in-Chief of the Bandit Suppression Forces in North China, was in Nanking for conferences. On the very night of his arrival, General Chang called on General Fu. Although details of their conversation were not revealed, there is no doubt that they exchanged opinions on the present political and military situation.

The next morning, General Chang called on President Chiang, and made a report to him. He also went to see General Ho Yin-ching, Minister of National Defence that same day.

At 9 o'clock in the evening, Mr. Shao Li-tze, another top-ranking official who is a strong advocate of peace in China, together with his wife, visited General Chang at the latter's residence, and had a long talk with the general, lasting for one and a half hours. It was reported that the next morning the General called on Dr. Sun Fo, then President of the Legislative Yuan.

Before his "secret trip" to Nanking, General Chang was said to have invited Mr. Shao Li-tze to proceed to Lanchow for consultation on national affairs. Mr. Shao, according to the report, was quite prepared to go. But later, it was revealed, he found it "inconvenient", and he abandoned his trip to the Northwest at the last moment.

Calls On Chiang

It is further reported that General Chang called on President Chiang several times during his recent stay in the national capital. The President was said to have talked only about the necessity for unity in order to strive harder and the need for faith in the final outcome of the war.

But General Chang, in his conversation with other friends, was reported to have expressed his opinion that under the present circumstances there could be only three "possibilities." These are:

(1) Sufficient aid from the United States, including the dispatch of an American expeditionary force to help the Government suppress the Chinese Communists.

(2) Unlimited aid from the United States for the full equipment of the Chinese Army.

(3) Struggle for survival by our own efforts.

Discussing the first, General Chang ruled it out at once as highly impossible. Dealing with the second, the General believed that America would not likely commit herself to do much. He said this is because "the Americans have already told us that their ammunition sent to China has benefited only the Communists, and their supplies and loans go only into the pockets of the officials." Analyzing the third possibility, the General stated that "this is really quite difficult under the present economic situation."

That is, none of these "three possibilities" would seem possible or even adequate to save China, in the opinion of General Chang. According to a reliable report, General Chang *did* propose the cessation of the war and the resumption of peace talks.

Two days after General Chang's arrival in Nanking the famous two open appeals for peace, signed by no less than 86 professors in Nanking and addressed to the President and Mao Tze-tung, were published.

It may be recalled here that the same general visited Nanking sometime last year. It was reported that before his return to the Northwest, he called on the President. The general was reported to have offered some advice to the President, and for a time, there was a crop of peace rumors.

It is also interesting to note that after the convocation of the National Assembly, all of the Nationalist headquarters in various parts of the country were reorganized into the Pacification Headquarters or the Bandit Suppression Campaign Headquarters. But the name of the headquarters in the Northwest remained unchanged. It is still known as the Director-General's Office of Political and Military Affairs in the Northwest with the "Democratic General" as the boss. Apparently, in view of all that was going on in the national capital, the *United Press* came out with a report that "agitation for peace, until recently confined to unofficial circles, has now penetrated into the Government's highest level as two top-ranking officials, General Chang Chih-chung and Mr. Shao Li-tze, recommended resumption of peace parleys to President Chiang Kai-shek."

Chen Pu-lei's Suicide

Coupled with General Chang Chih-chung's secret trip to Nanking was another instance which greatly shocked and mystified many observers. This was the tragic death of Mr. Chen Pu-lei, the President's most trusted confidential adviser, who committed suicide on the night of November 12 by taking an overdose of sleeping pills. The late Mr. Chen, as most people know, took part in practically all the major decisions made by the President for the past many years.

Although "mental strain" was given as the cause for his fatal decision, it is generally believed that his grief over the present state of national affairs as well as his inability to do anything for the nation was the actual cause of his suicide.

According to the report, two days before his death, he called on the President no less than three times and made a straightforward explanation of the present crisis to him. In particular, he was reported to have expressed his indignation over the failure of the Kuomintang to carry out the "Principle of the People's

Livelihood," one of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People." He was also reported to have launched a bitter attack on the unequal distribution of wealth in the country, where the living of the common people has been made more difficult than ever before. He attributed the present economic crisis to the failure of the recent currency reform, which was ill-planned and carried out by ex-Finance Minister Wang Yun-wu; and he characterized the whole situation as a "national blunder committed by a scholar."

An old friend of the late Chen Pu-lei, in commenting on the situation, said: "There is no doubt that Mr. Chen Pu-lei was loyal to the party, to the nation and to his leader. His great moral writings should be admired by all. However, his heart was filled with contradictions and pain. For this reason, his tragic death was generally predicted by us."

Frequent Occurence

The late Chen Pu-lei's suicide recalls an occurrence which happened frequently in ancient times, as recorded in China's history, when a loyal and courageous confidante tried to urge a stern ruler not to take an action by committing suicide in front of him.

It was reported that at a regular meeting of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on November 15, there was a heated debate on whether the late Chen Pu-lei's will should be released for publication. Chen Li-fu, leader of the "CC Clique," opposed the publication, while other members urged their release and threatened to quit the Council if their suggestion was not accepted.

At last, President Chiang gave authorization to publish Chen's nine separate wills to members of his family and two letters addressed to the President.

However, still to be released are Chen Pu-lei's diaries which, when published, will no doubt throw more light on his suicide and will give first hand information on the inner circles of the Kuomintong.

US China Policy

There is no doubt that there are plenty of people in China today who believe that China must not continue the war any longer. Up to now, there are already a few "martyrs" who have laid down their lives for the cause of peace in China. But the American attitude toward the present question before us is: What is the renewed peace movement in China?

Nanking has been pressing Washington for a pronouncement of a definite China policy, and a new US China policy is now under discussion by Truman and Marshall.

We know that the United States has maintained a strong navy in Tsingtao whose purpose is: ". . . . to see that Russia doesn't profit too much from Civil War. . . ." (See "Is Our Navy Trapped in China?" by Darrell Berrigan in *The Saturday Evening Post*, September 25, 1948).

We know that the United States has maintained military missions in no less than 17 nations throughout the world whose purpose is: " . . . To encourage the peoples and governments of the three countries (Greece, Turkey and Iran) to resist Soviet pressure, external and internal. . . . To reduce the danger of war by increasing the factor of risk in the minds of Soviet leaders. . . .If war does come, to compel the Russians to use up time and resources in overcoming local resistance, and to preserve areas of strategic importance for our use, principally by our air forces. . . ." (See "Why We Have Military Missions in 17 Nations" by George Fielding Eliot in the *New York Post*, September 7, 8 and 9, 1948.)

Many Chinese want an answer to the vital question: Is Uncle Sam intending to convert China into a second Greece, Turkey and Iran? As so aptly pointed out by Professor John King Fairbank in his *The United States and China*. "The greatest error that Americans can make is to look at China but think only of Russian expansion." Or will the United States divide its China policy and stop Russian expansion movement into two different parts, and direct its full attention on building a strong, united and democratic China in response to the popular Chinese wish?

Prevent War

So far, many Chinese are not too clear about Washington's intention. But my answer is that: "Today the real test of power is not capacity to make war but capacity to prevent it," (quoted from Anne O'Hare McCormick). In the case of China, the greatest American aid which is likely to be most appreciated by the majority of Chinese is one aimed at helping to end the present "Fratricidal War" with the quickest possible speed.

Therefore, in formulating a new China policy, Washington must take the present Chinese public sentiment for peace, reform and change into serious consideration. The present renewed peace movement should give added momentum to the policy framers in Washington.

Lastly, I feel ashamed of those who are fleeing to foreign lands for personal safety, while disregarding the nation's interests. But I take my hat off to those "Peace Sponsors" who are now exerting every effort for the cause of peace in China. The present movement is really important and deserves the wholehearted support of all patriotic Chinese and all of China's well-wishers.

Viet Nam's Fight For Freedom

William Johnson

(This is the first in a series of two articles tracing the development of Viet Nam's struggle for independence.)

JUST as the attempts by the French to crush the Viet Nam Republic by armed force have completely failed, their equally desperate attempts to disrupt Viet Nam political unity have met with no success whatsoever. Threats, vague promises, falsehoods and slander have failed to diminish the prestige of Ho Chi Minh or divide the loyalty of the population to the Viet Nam Government.

Base Laid In 1948

The basis for the present national unity of Viet Nam was laid in 1941 when Ho Chi Minh founded the Viet Minh, or League for the National Independence of Viet Nam, a united front of all patriotic parties and organizations, which led the resistance against the Japanese and Vichy French until 1945, and since 1945 against French aggression.

The realization of Viet Nam national unity with the formation of the Viet Minh came as a historically inevitable climax to the struggle for freedom throughout the 80 years of French rule.

In conquering Viet Nam the French had to subdue a people who had preserved their independence through the centuries, despite the constant threat from powerful neighboring kingdoms; and although France gained Cochin China (southern Viet Nam) as a colony in 1862 after three years fighting, it was not until 1884 that the whole country was brought under French domination. A treaty was signed with the Court of Hue by which the territories the French designed as Annam and Tonkin (central and northern Viet Nam) were placed nominally under the protectorate of France but in reality under French colonial rule.

Viet Nam was conquered, but the people were never subjugated. As the French gradually extended their hold over Viet Nam after 1862, continual uprisings in Cochin China supported resistance in the north and the uprisings continued even after the Court of Hue was forced to sign the Treaty of Protectorate.

Early Monarchism

Until the turn of the century the national liberation movement was

purely monarchist in character. The leaders of the countless insurrections and guerrilla campaigns came from the Viet Nam nobility and aimed at the expulsion of the French, the restoration of the full powers of the throne with the preservation of their own privileged position in a feudal society. The monarchist tendency finally came to an end with the exile of the youthful Emperor Duy Tham in 1916 after he had called for a general uprising and revolts broke out in the South. By placing Khai Dinh on the throne as successor to Duy Tham, the French brought the monarchy into general disrepute, for Khai Dinh was far removed from imperial lineage and was made emperor for the sole reason that he was a pliant and willing cooperator of the French administration.

The revolution of 1916 was not led entirely by monarchists, for since 1900 republican ideas had been rapidly gaining acceptance. Political events in China, the numerous peasant risings, the writings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the final overthrow of the Manchu dynasty considerably influenced the trend of the Viet Nam struggle against the French. The writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire also became known in Viet Nam—not from France, but, rather ironically, from smuggled Chinese translations. The defeat of Czarist Russia by Japan, where a number of Viet Nam exiles had found refuge and carried on their activities, had repercussions in Viet Nam as in all countries of Asia.

At the same time, leaders were emerging from the small number of Viet Nam intellectuals who had been educated in France where they became familiar with French traditions of liberty which were not exported to the colonies. The process soon became established by which Viet Nam intellectuals completed their acquaintance with French culture in one of the many prisons which the French administration had established throughout Viet Nam. A popular education movement, aiming at the achievement of Viet Nam independence by peaceful means, was launched in 1907 and rapidly gained a widespread following, but the following year it was smashed by the French who executed the leaders.

Middle Class Joins In

Gradually, political leadership of the national struggle passed from the feudal elements to the middle class—officials of the French administration, officers in the French army and small landowners—who had become a politically conscious group. The Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Kuo Min Tang), which adopted the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, was founded in 1924 and was an expression of this tendency. In 1925 the Revolutionary Youth of Viet Nam was founded by Ho Chi Minh. With an even more radical program than the Quoc Dan Dang, this organization developed among the students and intellectuals and was the first party to base its organization and the realization of its aims on the masses of the workers and peasants.

An inadequately organized national uprising led by the Quoc Dan Dang in 1930 was ruthlessly crushed and with this party practically annihilated as a political force, middle-class leadership was destroyed. From then on the struggle for freedom and independence became a mass movement headed by the workers in the mines and plantations.

The transformation was hastened by the calculated French policy since 1927 of dispossessing the peasantry in order to create a surplus labor force for the growing number of industrial enterprises. In 1930 the Communist Party of Indochina (Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia) was formed with the amalgamation of the three existing Marxist groups, and became the special target of French police action, with many Communist leaders tortured to death or guillotined.

No Uprisings

While from 1931 on, the French police prevented any revolutionary uprisings, the changed direction of the movement was shown by the frequent strikes in the plantations and mines at Hongay. A degree of freedom was permitted when the Popular Front government came to power in France, but there was never any question of granting political liberty in Viet Nam. Premier Leon Blum made many speeches and allowed thousands to be guillotined, imprisoned in the fetid cells of the French dungeons or exiled.

Nevertheless, the semi-legalized existence of the Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere (Fourth International) made possible the open, though continually harassed, organization of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. For the first time, the French permitted the observation of May Day and at Hanoi over 20,000 took part in a mass demonstration organized by the still-illegal trade unions. The demonstrators marched under slogans demanding a united front against the growing menace of aggression from Japan and demanding that democratic rights be accorded the people of Viet Nam, while the clique that ruled France and ruled Viet Nam were conniving with Hitler in Europe and with the Japanese militarists in Asia.

This policy of French ruling circles led to the betrayal of France herself and to the eclipse of French rule in Viet Nam when the Japanese occupied the country in 1940 following the fall of France. The Japanese, while maintaining complete control, did, however, allow the French to exercise nominal authority until March 1945, when the French were completely dispensed with. The political orientation of the French administration and the political sympathies of the overwhelming majority of the French population were clearly shown by the servile French collaboration with the Japanese during the war. There was not even much of a token resistance, either in 1940 or 1945 by the numerous French forces stationed in Viet Nam to uphold French rule. Their failure to prevent the Japanese from occupying Viet Nam constituted yet another violation by the French of the Treaty of Protectorate of 1884 by which France undertook to provide armed protection against any foreign invasion. Thus, from a purely juridical viewpoint France has forfeited much of her right to exercise authority in Viet Nam.

Strong Opposition

Japanese troops encountered strong opposition, not from the French but from the Viet Nam population as well, when crossing the border near Langson in 1940. In the same year a well-organized uprising was launched in the south, but the insurgents lacked arms and the revolt was suppressed by fierce joint action of the French and Japanese police and armed forces. French and Japanese planes bombed villages and machine-gunned fleeing inhabitants. Tens of thousands were rounded up and shot and about 20,000 more were imprisoned, most of whom died in the next three years from ill-treatment and starvation.

The resistance, however, was not crushed by the suppression of the 1940 uprisings. In 1941 the Quoc Dan Dang, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party and the Communist Party united in the formation of the Viet Minh, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.

In the face of many obstacles the Viet Minh organized a nationwide resistance, and in 1943 Ho Chi Minh succeeded in persuading the American authorities in Chungking to provide arms for the Viet Nam guerrillas. Shortly afterwards the National Liberation Army was created and, though there were still not sufficient arms, the Viet Nam guerrillas gained control of seven provinces in the north and conducted a very effective campaign of sabotage of Japanese installations in all parts of the country. The double yoke of French and Japanese oppression increased the sufferings of the population, but resulted in a strengthening of its determination to throw off the yoke of foreign domination. The resistance organized by the Viet Minh succeeded only by reason of the people's support and the degree of this success illustrates clearly how solidly they had united behind the Viet Minh.

When the Japanese surrendered on August 15 a provisional government headed by Ho Chi Minh was formed and the independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was proclaimed on September 21. Bao Dai had already wisely abdicated.

With the object of removing any possible obstacle to maintaining national unity, the Communist Party was dissolved in November 1945. Communists continued to participate in the Viet Minh, but only as individuals, not as members of a party organization. This fact alone should be sufficient to refute the oft-repeated plaint of French propaganda that the

Viet Minh and the Viet Nam government are controlled by the Communist Party.

The provisional government continued in office until the holding of the general elections on January 6, 1946, which were conducted on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. At that time French troops had gained control of Saigon and hostilities had spread throughout the south, but over 90 percent of eligible voters, that is, all inhabitants over the age of 18 years, participated in the elections. Votes were cast even in Saigon.

Of the 300 deputies to the Viet Nam National Assembly there are 27 Socialists, 45 Democrats, 22 deputies of the Dong Minh Hoi and 26 from the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang. Only 10 deputies had been members of the dissolved Communist Party. Deputies having no party affiliations whatever gained 170 seats.

The Dong Minh Hoi, holding 22 seats, was formed in Chunking in 1943 and subsequently joined the Viet Minh. It was founded, with the encouragement of certain Chinese official circles, by a small group of Viet Nam nationals who had been resident in China over a long period, but none of its leaders was at all well-known and the program of the party was extremely vague. Consequently, the Dong Minh has never gained any considerable following. Some of the original leaders deserted to the French, but the present leadership and membership firmly support the Viet Minh and the resistance against the French.

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The Week's Business

THE many uncertainties of political life during the week ending December 1 impressed the market unfavorably. At the same time the amazingly firm financial policy carried out by the Government helped in fighting defeatism and panic.

The Central Bank and its appointed banks continued to sell gold to the public at the same rate as before, i.e. GY1,000 for one ounce of gold plus GY1,000 to be paid in as deposit. News from the clandestine exchange market, revealed that the Government rate was very favorable and the demand, therefore, continued to be heavy on the banks selling gold to the public.

On the other hand, the new increase in the Cost-Of-Living Index by 93 percent, as announced on November 30, was regarded as too high rather than too low. Businessmen took it for granted that the increase was this great for political rather than economic reasons.

Meanwhile, as military news was far from favorable during the week under review, importers as well as their clients decided to have new Shanghai-bound cargo unloaded in South China. The uncertain future of Shanghai, particularly after the experience in Chinwangtao where the Nationalist Navy bombarded the harbor installations with a view to preventing them from falling into Communist hands, prompted practically all importers to order goods to Hongkong and Canton. The exodus of Chinese offices from Shanghai continued throughout the week under review with some firms shifting their main offices to Canton, while others chose Taiwan.

Foreign businessmen were particularly impressed by the above mentioned news from the north and were worrying about their huge Shanghai investments in the case of further Communist advances toward or along the Yangtze River. Investors, however, were not the only ones to be so impressed; workers and employees, too, had several questions to ask along the same line.

With conditions as they are at present, exporters were eager to ship old stocks and in many cases could do so. Export results during the week under review were quite satisfactory. It was a much more difficult task, however, to find and carry to Shanghai new cargoes intended for future export. In some lines, the Central Trust of China intervened in favor of prospective exporters and aided in financing purchases. It was but a matter of course, however, that when it came to investing private, commercial funds, the respective firms were extremely reluctant to invest them; investing large funds in future exports appeared a risky affair and most preferred to wait and see rather than "to carry on as usual."

While the rice price came down further, and while commodity prices in general advanced very slowly—thus resulting in a very slow increase in the tempo of inflation—the real estate market realized a slump. The demand for real estate was small and the turnover trifling. There was a certain demand for small houses, mostly by people who in view of the state of affairs in the north had come to Shanghai which they considered comparatively safe. Larger estates, some of which used to be residences of wealthy local families were for sale so far without buyers. The evacuation of Americans together with the announced evacuation of many Europeans, also impressed the real estate market in all sectors.

Meanwhile, local trading slackened and goods which had been scarce a week or so ago, suddenly appeared on the market in considerably large quantities. Old, hidden stocks reappeared. In order to be on the safe side, holders of such stocks apparently preferred to get rid of them and to use the proceeds of sales for buying gold or other easily transportable valuables.

At the same time, prices of various industrial raw materials came down and in certain cases were below the original F.O.B. prices. Such declines were caused firstly by the still comparatively tight money market; secondly, by news from Hongkong to the effect that stocks there were tremendous. Hongkong prices were reported to have declined as a consequence of large arrivals in the Colony of cargoes originally intended for northern there were numerous. Hongkong Firms abroad which had shipped goods about three or four weeks ago, hoping to get them forwarded to Shanghai, ordered them to be unloaded in Hongkong. Simultaneously, cargoes originally intended for Tientsin (and then, when the situation worsened in the north, for Shanghai) are now stored in Hongkong.

Among the various goods, prices of which declined as a result of recent political developments were industrial chemicals and various products such as dyestuffs needed by the textile industries.

While rumors had it that the Stock Exchange would be re-opened during the week under review, no such order was issued by the authorities. Yet, on the clandestine market, stock prices came down still further and it was generally anticipated that if the Exchange should be opened this week, there would be still further losses.

NEWS OF THE WEEK

Sun Fo Forms War-Time Cabinet; Hsuchow Battle Shifting South

DR. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, on November 26, was formally named President of the Executive Yuan in succession to Dr. Wong Wen-hao who resigned last month as a result of the disastrous collapse of the Government's currency reform program. He is expected to resign from the Presidency of the Legislative Yuan because, under the Constitution it is forbidden to hold the two jobs at the same time.

Sun told newspapermen in Shanghai that his cabinet will be staffed with a selected small group of ministers who will be able to make decisions without the prior approval of the President. He stressed that his cabinet will be a "war-time" cabinet, which will try to include the various factions of the Kuomintang so as to insure close cooperation.

Premier Sun attached particular importance to his American background and to the need of larger American aid to this country. In an exclusive interview with the *United Press*, Sun recalled that he was educated largely in the United States and that his father, the founder of the Chinese Republic, had cultivated the friendship of many Americans and spent a great deal of time in the United States. With this background, he said, it was natural to assume that his government would reflect in many ways an American point of view.

His personal opinion, he continued, is that China must be prepared to make any reasonable concessions to obtain major American military assistance at the earliest possible time, and he will recommend this policy to his cabinet. In his opinion, China needs some outstanding American military figure, such as General Douglas MacArthur, to be supreme military adviser in the conduct of the war against the Communists, and China must be prepared to give this adviser full powers.

Asked if he would favor re-opening the Yangtze River and other inland waterways to American and other foreign shipping for the landing of cargoes from foreign ports and the loading of cargoes for foreign destinations, Dr. Sun replied that he would. Under certain circumstances, United States naval forces, he added, should be allowed to use inland waterways as American military advisers might desire. There should be no objection to a system under which US warships operate on the Yangtze as a patrol group.

The new Premier also expressed himself in favor of an immediate "new deal" for foreign business interests in Shanghai and elsewhere in China under which the interests of foreign traders will be given every reasonable encouragement and protection.

* * *

Destruction At C'wangtao

Reuter reported from Tientsin that Britons, Americans and other foreigners in Peiping and Tientsin expressed fear over the reported wholesale destruction of foreign property at Chinwangtao. The story read in part: "These fears were aroused by the reports, now confirmed, of the destruction of the Sino-British Kailan Mining Administration's installations in Chinwangtao, and the threat posed to similar installations in Tongshan. Demolition of these installations on the plea of scorched earth tactics would represent the destruction of fabulous foreign investments. Britons said the decision to remain in North China—reached by most Britons and Americans—would be pointless in the face of such apparent lack of protection accorded foreign property, assiduously built up through decades of participation in China's industrialization. Foreigners here were also wondering if what happened in Chinwangtao could be taken as an indication of Nanking's over-all policy on the matter of foreign investments. Naturally, foreigners, to whom such questions now loom large, were planning to bring this consideration to higher levels. They now feel they are directly affected by the progress of the Civil War." It was later revealed that one Nationalist gunboat and two LST type vessels shelled and demolished Chinwangtao's elaborate breakwater and harbor installations. Property of the Kailan Mining Administration was also reported to have been destroyed.

* * *

Hu Shih Declines Offer

ACCORDING to *Reuter*, the appointment of Sun Fo as Premier was viewed in informed circles in Nanking as "the last political resort after President Chiang Kai-shek had practically given up hope for an open promise from Washington of a greater measure of American aid which would have been a bargaining point for another man considering acceptance of the premiership."

In this connection, it is interesting to recall that Dr. Hu Shih, President of the National Peiping University and one-time Chinese ambassador to the United States, confirmed on November 27 in Peiping that President Chiang prior to Sun Fo's nomination, had invited him to form a cabinet. He said he declined the offer which was transmitted to him by Tao Shih-sheng, vice director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, on the grounds that "he was not able enough."

After his appointment, Sun went on record that he did not think much of the minority parties and what he wants to do is to form a strong government composed of all influential leaders of the various conflicting groupings inside the Kuomintang.

* * *

Fighting Moves Southward

THE battle for Hsuchow is gradually shifting southward, as the Communists transferred their main strength for a determined drive on Pengpu and other centers south of Pengpu. *UP* reported on November 29 that a large Communist army in the Suhsien-Lingpi area had broken was rolling southward towards Pengpu through Government roadblocks and in the direction of the Yangtze River. Advance Communist units were said to have reached points between Kuchen and Szehsien about 125 miles north of the Yangtze.

Analyzing the situation, *UP* said: "It was believed that this Communist army of about 150,000 men will bypass Pengpu, which is strongly defended by about 26 divisions, and cut a swathe toward the rural areas on the northern bank of the Yangtze River. By this maneuver, it was pointed out that the Communists would not only be able to push their threat to the vicinity of Nanking but also bring them into territories thinly garrisoned by the Nationalists. Their superior rural warfare experience was expected also to give them an edge over the Nationalists.

Reuter further disclosed on November 28, that south of Pengpu an estimated 10,000 Communists had penetrated into the Changpaling area, 35 miles north of Nanking. A survey made by *UP* revealed that the Communists have captured or rendered inoperative more than half of the vital 265-mile Hsuchow-Nanking Railway. It is understood that the railway has been sliced up into three portions, completely isolating Hsuchow and Pengpu, two main points. The two bastions are now depending entirely on airlifts for supplies. As the situation stands today, government train traffic runs along a 125 mile stretch of the railway, from Nanking to Changpaling, from Pengpu southward to Mingkuang and northward to Jenchiao, and 20 miles from Hsuchow southward to Sanpao.

Military observers are of the opinion that the Communists obviously are now applying their well known and thus far effective "starving out" tactics. They appear to have abandoned frontal attacks on strongly-defended Hsuchow and their main forces have now shifted southward and are concentrating along

the railway linking Hsuchow with Nanking. This Communist maneuver seemed to put them in a more favorable spot since the railway corridor south of Hsuchow is known to be not so strongly garrisoned as Hsuchow.

In order to meet the increasing Communist threat to strategic centers south of Hsuchow, two Nationalist army groups massed in Hsuchow are reported to have been transferred southward, thus giving rise to rumors that the Nationalists are abandoning Hsuchow. But the rumors were categorically denied by the Government.

* * *

Madame Chiang Visits US

TO try to obtain greater aid from the United States, Madame Chiang Kai-shek left for the United States on November 28. How China's first lady is going to do her job remains to be seen, but *AP* revealed that most experts in Washington believe she will build up her case for American aid primarily on two points:

1) That the Chinese Government is waging not merely a civil war against rebellious elements of its own people but also carrying on a greater struggle against Communism in behalf of the US and all other anti-Communist countries.

2) That the United States has an obligation, as well as an opportunity, to turn the tide for Chiang by supplying the help he has requested.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that President Chiang Kai-shek was reported in the press to have told President Truman that the United States is obliged to rescue China from the Communists due to alleged United States diplomatic mistakes at Yalta. Diplomatic informants disclosed that Chiang's appeal to Truman blamed many of his government's difficulties on the Yalta Agreement in general and the treaty with Russia in particular. It was stressed that China signed the treaty against his better judgment, and only because of American diplomatic commitments at Yalta.

In Nanking, it was officially hinted that Madame Chiang's mission, in addition to appealing for American aid, will urge the United States and Britain to take the lead in forming an anti-Communist bloc in the whole of the Far East to supplement China's fight to contain Communism.

* * *

American Caution

WHILE aware that the situation in China, caused by the southward sweep of the Communist armies, is critical, Secretary of State Marshall told the press that he was presented with "a difficult problem which has to be considered very carefully." Marshall's statement was described as "disappointing" by officials in Nanking.

UP reported from Washington on November 29: "American policy makers let it be known in advance that Madame Chiang Kai-shek will have a hard job convincing them that the United States should become deeply involved in China's Civil War. . . . American officials doubt the wisdom of all-out aid to Chiang's Government because: firstly, such a move might be accepted as a challenge by Russia; secondly, the magnitude of what is frequently referred to as the Chinese puzzle is staggering; thirdly, the Nationalist Government has been unable to instill in its people or armies a will to fight the Communists; fourthly, a large-scale commitment in China would have a good chance of failing, and it might also jeopardize United States efforts to shore up Western Europe against Communism."

These and other factors have served to delay a decision by President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall on the China problem, it is explained. As regards Sun Fo's suggestion that an American commander be dispatched to advise the Nationalist forces, official reaction in Washington was said to be lukewarm. Top-flight defense and diplomatic officials feel that American advice offered thus far in China has been almost completely disregarded.

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

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US Magazine Roundup

Pacific Affairs

CH'IEN Tuan-sheng in an article entitled, "The Role of the Military in Chinese Government," published in the September 1948 *Pacific Affairs*, points out that until very recent times, China was free from domination by military influences.

"The misfortune of modern China is that, at the time of the multitude of paper reforms which enshrouded the country in the first decade of this century, she should have entertained a serious liking for the military institutions of Prussia and Japan"....

After tracing the increasing importance of the military in political affairs, particularly with the ascendancy of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the author goes on to say:

"It is obvious that inability to put the military in its proper place has plagued China during the last generation. That the Chinese army has been ill-disciplined and badly organized is equally obvious. A measure of neutralization, which would release the armed forces from personal and partisan loyalties and other political biases, is recognized as constituting the first prerequisite for the improvement not only of the forces themselves but also of the general administration."....

"The supremacy of the military creates problems in all spheres—political, constitutional and administrative—not to mention the effect of a large army on the national economy.

"Aside from the fact that it has an all-powerful leader in Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang is disrupted by its inclusion of a number of factions. The military group, centered on graduates of Whampoa, is not the only faction and has in fact not been the most powerful; but because the Whampoa Group controls the armies of the Kuomintang Government, it has been an important factor in the disunity of the Party. It has also prevented the Party from engaging in purely political activities, which might have enabled the latter to become more deeply rooted in the nation."....

"Administratively, military domination enfeebles the civilian authorities. The secondary role of the Executive Yuan in relation to the Military Commission needs no further emphasis. As a matter of fact, military interference in civilian administration is not nearly so bad in the Central Government as in the local, where the domination of the military has prevented the development of decent and orderly administration.

"The economic consequences of military domination are equally disastrous. One result has been disproportionate military expenditures. Ever since the establishment of the Kuomintang regime, when expenditures could be roughly known, half or more of the total annual budget has always been spent on military items, to the detriment of services of a more constructive nature. Defenders of military expenditures of course argue that unavoidable wars, both civil and foreign, have necessitated them. But the sad thing is that in China the military men, restrained neither by law nor by a sense of responsibility for the popular welfare, have always found wars to be necessary, and these 'necessary wars' have constantly depleted the coffers of the state and wrought desolation on the countryside. Has there been since the establishment of the Republic any war except the war against Japan which has been popular and for which money has been willingly spent by the people?

"There can be no salvation for China until the military is brought under proper control. The armed forces must be so reduced in size as to be compatible with the economic capacity of the nation. They must be nationalized. As a first condition of securing their loyalty to the nation and removing them from politics, they must be made non-partisan and freed from allegiance to individual leaders or political groups. This is essential. If it is necessary to have a powerful political group to check the military, such a group must be developed. Or, if a mass force is necessary for the purpose, such a force must be organized. For, unless the military is confined to its proper place, orderly government is impossible. Proper control of the military may not mean instant realization of orderly government, but orderly government is dependent on proper control of the military. China has suffered at the hands of the militarists in the recent past and still suffers today. She will continue to suffer unless a future regime is able to dominate instead of be dominated by the militarists."

* * *

The Nation

In The *Nation's* November 27, 1948, issue, Julian Schuman discusses "Nanking's Bitter Tea."

"Even old China hands have been astonished by the pace of recent events here. Many of them have been brought around to reality so rapidly that they are getting ready to clear out. Within a period of less than a month the Chinese Communist armies have taken all of Manchuria, the richest area in China, virtually sealed the fate of North China, and advanced dangerously close to the capital at Nanking."....

"Signs of treachery and sagging morale among high-ranking Kuomintang army officers were visible soon after the start of the vigorous Communist offensive this autumn. The fall of Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province, on September 23 was marked by the desertion of the commander of the 84th Division, General Wu Hua-wen, with his men at the height of the battle. A few weeks later the Yunnanese General, Tseng Tsi-sheng, gave up not only Changchun, the capital of Manchuria, but the entire 60th Army."....

But since the Nationalist position in the north began to crumble, they (Nationalist field commanders) have allowed themselves to be captured in increasing numbers."....

"The loudly touted currency reforms introduced by the government were proved a failure in less than three months' time. The gold yuan, valued officially at four to the American dollar, was ushered onto the scene on August 19 to replace the Chinese national currency (CNC), but by the beginning of November it had cracked wide open and was sold on the black market.... Many Chinese newspapers called this reform 'Chiang's last trump,' and it may well have been the final straw which broke the back of China's upper middle class. Small businessmen, storekeepers, professional men, and office workers had thought and hoped that it would save China's inflation-ridden economy. At one time among the strongest supporters of Chiang Kai-shek, these groups obeyed the order to convert their private holdings of foreign currency, gold and silver into gold yuan. But having converted chiefly during August and September, when the official value was maintained, they were soon left high and dry with stacks of a much devalued money"....

"Early in November the government set a new rate of 20 to one though the black market rate was much higher and abandoned restrictions on the possession of gold, silver, and foreign currency.

"As the blackmarket rate climbed, the people swarmed into the shops to exchange their fast depreciating money for goods. Goods, however, were scarce, and prices were far above the blackmarket rate. There was not much the holders of gold yuan could do but watch the value drop. The foreign currency, gold, and silver turned in amounted to about $190,000,000, according to official government figures. Wealthy Chinese are not believed to have contributed very much. It is no secret that they have most of their property abroad.

"It is not too difficult to see what is eating the little man here, the man who had faith in his government and put his small holdings into the new money. Not only is his investment losing its value, but his money is not accepted when he tries to buy something. The rice dealer and the butcher have no desire to part with their vital commodities for 'Chiang's last trump.'"

Chinese Magazine Roundup

Economic Critic

THE *Economic Critic* of November 13 calls serious attention to the fact that in formulating any economic measures to cope with the present emergency it is vitally importportant to keep in mind the welfare and livelihood of the people.

"The common people have no prejudiced like or dislike for any government. What they desire most is a life free from hunger and from fear—a peaceful, fair and progressive life. But three years of civil strife have dashed their hopes. The war has brought a fast and loose life for a handful of people and an unsettled and risky life for the majority of the people. The privileged few move about unmolested while the unfortunate majority of the people get blamed at every turn. For the past three years, the people have been waiting patiently for an early termination of this deplorable state of things. But today, their minimum living has been jeopardized by the failure of the Government's currency reform program. When price controls were on, the people had nothing to buy. When prices were unfrozen, there were plenty of goods on the market but the people simply could not afford the prices. Under such circumstances, how can you expect the people to have faith? It is only natural that they should ask: What's all this about after all?

"Some people argue that if the people have faith in the Gold Yuan notes, the notes will have a high value. But the question arises: What has the Gold Yuan in itself to appeal to the faith of the people? Who has undermined popular faith in the Gold Yuan? Are the consumers to blame if they want to buy goods with the little money they have? Who has compelled them to do so? It is said that in the present crisis, the businessmen should not raise their prices and should sell more commodities as dictated by their conscience. If police action has failed to bring them to terms, how can you expect mere moral appeals to do the trick? However, the basic question remains: Who has created such opportunities for them to make big money? . . .

"Obviously, things have deteriorated to such a point that it is becoming impossible for the common people to eke out a bare living. We can not stand the sight of the untold sufferings of the people. We would like to ask: What are the lofty aims of the present fighting?

"Are we fighting for the freedom of the people? The past three years have witnessed drastic curtailment of the people's freedom as the result of the intensification and spread of the war. Are we fighting for social equality? What we have seen during the past three years is an alarming widening in the gap between the rich and the poor. The Government has displayed neither determination nor vigor to correct this wrong situation. Are we fighting for political democracy? The people do not wish war, but fighting is still in progress. Besides, democracy must safeguard the interests of the majority of the people. But what we have seen around us is consideration for the interests of the bureaucrats and privileged. Democracy calls for fairness, tolerance and compromise but we have instead selfishness, prejudices and dictatorship.

"If the warring parties are not fighting for political power, it is high time that they carefully consider the situation as a whole . . . Under the present economic debacle, the common people cannot stand any more fighting. In order to preserve the national strength, in order to lay a foundation for political liberty and in order to build up economic equality, it is hoped that far-sighted and intelligent statesmanship will prevail. It is time to review the basic national policies as a whole. A government may win military battles but no government will last long if it ignores the livelihood of the people."

* * *

China Reconstruction

PROFESSOR Liu Pang-nien in *China Reconstruction* of November 21, thinks little of the so-called public opinion polls in the United States, pointing out that such polls seldom amount to much. Nevertheless, he suggests that Dr. Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public Opinion, be invited to come to China to conduct polls on the Civil War.

"Political observers are different from experts on public opinion polls," Professor Liu writes. "The former base their conclusions on experience and judgment. Even if they make mistakes, they can offer some kind of explanation. The latter base their conclusions on tabulation and scientific methods. Therefore, they should not make any mistake, otherwise the very system of public opinion polls would be subjected to doubt.

"Take the recent presidential elections in the United States for example. According to press stories, political observers and public opinion poll experts were agreed beforehand that the election would bring the first Republican president in 20 years into the White House. It was generally taken for granted that Republican candidate Dewey would be elected. The results of public opinion polls conducted the few months before the election invariably demonstrated the ever-increasing popularity and strength of Dewey at the expense of Truman . . .

"Personally, I doubt very much the efficacy of conducting polls on public opinion, not so much because such polls have been proved wrong in the recent presidential elections in the United States as because I don't think much of the practice of ascertaining public opinion by holding polls.

"It seems to me that public opinion is an unknown factor. It may be anybody's guess but it cannot be polled on a scientific basis. Public opinion can be created or mis-represented. I fail to understand what kind of public opinion the experts want to sound out. I am inclined to believe that the conducting of public opinion polls is merely a by-product of the attempt to make a science of politics . . .

"Public opinion is generally respected and democracy is usually defined as a kind of government controlled by public opinion. But as a matter of fact, public opinion has often been utilized by the ruling classes for selfish purposes. In the middle of the 19th Century, Louis Napoleon was proclaimed emperor by a general election. Did the French people at the time really want him to be their emperor? A recent example is furnished by the seizure of power of Hitler in Germany. Hitler also had "public opinion" behind him. But did this mean that the German people wanted Hitler to be their dictator? Here in this country, we have a constitutional government, the national assembly, the legislative yuan and bandit-suppression operations. All these are said to be representing the will of the people. But do we really want such a national assembly, legislative yuan and such a bandit-suppression policy?

"Public opinion is respectable in itself. But it may be molded by the vested interests.

"If public opinion could be ascertained at the polls by the experts the whole political system would be revolutionized. Elections would be substituted by public opinion polls, which save both time and money. In that case, even the government agencies would become superfluous. We could easily leave everything to Dr. Gallup and his disciples to work out at public opinion polls.

"As Chinese, we should like to suggest that Dr. Gallup be requested to come to China to conduct two public opinion polls on the following questions: 1) Do the Chinese people want fighting? 2) Who will win the war, the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communists? If public opinion in this country is to be respected, there will no bandit-suppression campaign or revolution shortly after the results of the polls are known. If Dr. Gallup were willing, his public opinion polls might prove a way to peace for China."

What Chinese Papers Say

EDITORIAL comment in Chinese newspapers last week centered on American policy in China. Most papers stressed the extreme gravity of the present situation in China and its potential danger to the United States and called upon the Truman Administration to extend all-out, immediate aid, military as well as economic, to the Chinese Government. In the midst of current clamoring for a clarification of United States China policy, some papers predicted that there will be no basic change in this respect.

* * *

US Policy

THE *Tung Nan Jih Pao* said now is the time for the United States to clarify her China policy and any procrastination would do much harm. "After Admiral Cooke expressed his dissatisfaction with the China policy of the United States, the State Department promptly issued a statement, pointing out that the object of US China policy did not differ from the views of the Admiral and the question was only one of difference in method. Superficially, we should voice no further dissatisfaction with the statement by the State Department, for the US Government, according to the spokesman of the State Department, 'has been consistently carrying out its policy of supporting the Chinese Government.'

"But since Americans traditionally attach tremendous importance to efficiency, we would like to ask: During the past two years when the Chinese Communists, backed by international influence, have exerted such heavy pressure on the Chinese Government, what effects have American aid produced and what future results can be expected under the China-aid program? Needless to say, no contribution of a decisive nature can be expected. . .

"The situation has come to such a pass that no further procrastination should be allowed. One year ago, China had anticipated larger and more timely American aid. Unfortunately, the actual aid turned out to be not only behind schedule but also too small to be of any practical use. This is one of the important factors in causing the present deterioration in the China situation during the last six months. Therefore, it is feared that difference in method may result in a change in the objective. We hope the State Department will consider this phase of the problem."

Drawing a comparison between China and Greece, the *Sin Wan Pao* complained that the United States has been unfair to China.

"We have never attempted to conceal the fact that administrative efficiency in the Chinese Government is not high and that corruption and malpractices do exist. But a fair conclusion can only be drawn from a comparative study of different countries. The United States adopts a positive attitude in giving aid to Western Europe and her viewpoint on Western Europe is also different from that on China. According to the magazine, *US News and World Report*, the United States started extending aid to Greece in 1947. At the time there were 25,000 Communist guerillas in Greece. Up to now American aid to Greece has added up to US$550,000,000, but there are still 25,000 guerillas in that country.

"Greece is a country with only 25,000 guerillas and yet her situation still remains bad. In China, there are 3,000,000 bandit troops, and the country has gone through 10 years of ceaseless warfare. How can the Americans expect everything in China to be ideal? If Greece is to be taken as an example, then China infested with 3,000,000 bandits should have been given aid to the extent of US$34,000,000,000. But our latest request is only for US$1,000,000,000. And the United States still displays hesitation over this insignificant figure. Worse still, the United States still continues to hurl attacks on China, thereby undermining the self-confidence of the Chinese people. We can hardly believe anything could have been more unfair and more unreasonable. . ."

The *Chien Sien Jih Pao* made a stirring appeal for Sino-American cooperation. After making a brief review of the charges and countercharges made by the American and Chinese Government, the paper stressed that it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries.

"We are looking forward to strong cooperation between China and the United States. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) The balance of power in Asia has ben upset and we need the cooperation of the United States in maintaining an equilibrium of power and peace in Asia: (2) The United States has no territorial designs on China. She wants investment facilities and she alone can help us in our industrialization plans.

"On our part, there is no reason why we should not seek the friendship of the United States. . .We support all-out cooperation with the United States. It may be argued that the Americans are imperialists. Even so, it will make no difference. The type of imperialism China fears is that which harbors territorial ambitions, not economic imperialism. It was precisely for this reason that we lined up with Britain and the US in fighting Japan. The situation in China today is by no means different from what it was after the Mukden Incident of 1931."

* * *

No Change

THE independent *Ta Kung Pao* saw no change in US China policy.

"What is United States policy in China? This is a question which is the main concern of the public today. As a matter of fact, if we look at the problem in a cool, objective manner, we will find that the basic principles underlying US policy toward China have undergone no change. If there have been any changes they are mere ripples on a quiet, deep pool. . .

"The Truman Administration supports the Chinese Government. So does Secretary Marshall's policy. This premise will not be changed easily. But the current world situation is developing along delicate lines. In Western Europe, reports have been circulated of an American-Soviet rapprochement. No matter how great the distance between the East and the West may be, there is a general desire for peace and the slowing down of the cold war. This is one aspect of the problem.

"In the East, the situation in China has suddenly undergone a drastic change. The military situation in Manchuria has been basically altered. The currency reform program has met with a serious hitch. The result of the Presidential election in America was 'unexpected.' All these developments have combined to aggravate the critical situation in this country. . .

"Generally speaking, there will be no basic change in US China policy in the immediate future. There are contradictions between the actual situation and what the American leaders want. Both Truman and Marshall have their own troubles and worries. Matters connected with China are being handled in a state of anxiety and perplexity."

Taking a similar tune, the Catholic organ *Yi Shih Pao* wrote:

"As long as Truman remains master of the White House, the traditional attitude of the United States Government toward China will not be changed. Needless to say, the Chinese people who appeal for aid at the time when their national crisis is so acute will be denied the support they richly deserve.

"The United States is not necessarily reliable, especially in time of distress. Therefore, we can only rely on ourselves. And in fact, there is no other way out except by self-help."

What US Papers Say

AMERICAN policy for China continued to be the center of US press comment. In addition to editorial comment there was comparatively large coverage by political observers—having a variety of political background. Of the latter, the largest number continued to oppose all-out military aid to the Nationalist Government while looking for a new US policy for this "complex and difficult situation." However, there was a very articulate group of supporters for all-out aid. The major tasks confronting President Truman were also dealt with.

* * *

Chinese Vortex

THE *Washington Post* ran a lengthy editorial dealing with the China problem and the difficulties it presents to US policy makers. It stated in part:

. . . "Only a blind man could fail to see that the old policy is thoroughly bankrupt—the policy of thinking of China only in terms of Chiang Kai-shek, of supporting him with aid and arms in his struggle to keep a non-existent power. There should be a clean break with the past. Our policy hitherto has helped the Communists more than their own strength has, for it has amassed for them American arms, Chinese sympathy, and a stand-pat attitude on the part of the stubborn Chiang Kai-shek himself which has been his own undoing. The Generalissimo is now calling for help, and inspired news from Nanking is already anticipating its arrival. Doubtless Chiang Kai-shek in his communication to Mr. Truman promised full powers for any high-ranking American that the President might dispatch. But that has already been tried. First in such a role was General Stilwell, and, as his book testified, he quickly realized the hopelessness of trying to save China through Chiang Kai-shek. The same experience befell General Marshall. . . .

"It was because of the alarming facility with which the Nationalist divisions turn into American arms-carriers for the Communists that we suggested that our obligated aid should be sent to Fu Tso-yi and other generals nominally loyal to Chiang Kai-shek who have shown themselves capable of using it. But the obligation was with Chiang, and to him, apparently, the remaining aid has been consigned. It is now opportune to revamp our American policy so as to relieve ourselves of Chiang Kai-shek's coat-tails. A new policy should be based squarely on the American interest in the Far East. That is, first and foremost, the protection of American lives and property in key ports of the Chinese littoral. Such a service the Marines have done for more than a century in places where organized government has disintegrated. We would go further and establish these and other centers of security in the Far East in concert with the members of the embryonic Atlantic pact, for these powers happen to comprise those Western powers with interests in the Far East. A common interest is now at stake and requires to be safeguarded but that interest does not extend to entanglement in the Chinese morass.

"It will take the Chinese a long time to work out their own salvation, but only the Chinese can do it. Those who fear a quick organization of China under Communist auspices know the dimensions neither of the problem nor of the country. It is this fear that is putting a premium on panic counsels of aid to Chiang on the Greek model. The security and the resources of this country would be frittered away by indulging in such a program. Non-involvement in China is imposed upon our policy-makers—and should be so declared—by the strategy of Russo-Western conflict. Strategy would go out the window if we allowed ourselves to be dragged into an anti-Communist crusade wherever there was a Communist irruption."

Along these lines, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* observed: "Without minimizing the undesirableness of Chinese Communist conquest, it ought to be possible for the US policy-makers to evolve a long-range and unveering China policy which will cease pouring billions down a rathole, as at present, and offer eventual hope of a popular government in China."

The Scripps-Howard *Washington News* held that the Chinese "are in immediate need of small arms, ammunition and planes, and money to buy goods." Urging the President to make a decision favorable to large-scale aid, the *News* said: "The fate of China, and possibly of all Asia, may hang upon the President's reply . . . and that reply may determine ultimate success or failure of the Truman-Marshall foreign policy."

The *New York Post*, maintained: "China seeks more and more military help from us in the name of combatting Communism. We should refuse any assistance whatever to such a corrupt regime. If we cannot effectively be for the people—we must not, at least, continue to be against them."

The *Watertown Times* declared: "It would seem to be that the best we can hope for, unless the Communists are stopped, is a coalition government with the Communists participating. It is not a pleasant prospect, but we might just as well face it."

The *New York Star* contended that the US "could outdo the Soviet 'peace offensive' by urging an immediate truce in China, and demanding that the UN send a commission to work out complex details." The *Star* said: "The President is on record as saying that the US would not countenance a coalition government in China which included the Communists. But General Marshall has not publicly renounced his opinion, that salvation of the situation would be assumption of leadership by liberals in the Government and the minority parties."

* * *

Truman's Tasks

THE *New York Times*, in an editorial entitled "End of a Vacation," declared: "President Truman will be entering on the major tasks which will face him during the four years of his elective term. Not the least among these will be foreign policy. Even though that policy has been, and is, bipartisan, there remain many questions to be decided concerning its working out. We are in the midst of the great ideological battle of the twentieth century.

"Mr. Truman and his two advisers will need a map of the world if they are to discuss all the areas in which American interests are involved and American hopes committed. They will have to consider Berlin, and in considering Berlin they will have to look at the possibilities of formal peace with Germany and Austria. They will have to consider Palestine, an area in which a great experiment in the formation of a new state is under way, but in which also there are entangling considerations of military strategy and of oil resources. Finally, they can hardly avoid talking of China and what we are to do in China. Out of the vast confusion of that nation of half a billion people there must come some order and some settlement if the Orient is ever to be peaceful and prosperous. The news of the last few weeks has dampened hopes and has apparently brought us in this country new responsibilities. A few more days of fighting may reveal how much strength Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government still possesses, but no news from China is likely to diminish the demands that have been and will be made for further American help. . . .

"President Truman, Secretary Marshall and roving ambassador Harriman will have this vast scene before them. They will be thinking in economic terms when they talk of the progress of European recovery and also if their discussion turns, as it probably will, toward China. They will be talking of the great project of reviving human energy and productive power in the non-Communist nations. They may talk also in military terms, for it is clear that the defense of Western civilization must be potentially military as well as economic. Indeed, the two phases can scarcely be separated. But there is a limit on what the United States can do in either field in any country. That limit, after Congress meets next January, will have to be marked out in precise terms. We may assume that those terms are now being worked upon by experts. But the principles will seemingly have to be determined without long delay." . . .

The Review's English Lesson—LX

This week, we shall discuss another text from TIME magazine of September 27, part of a story on the last moon festival.

"Wars, dynasties and governments come and go," 1) but China's ancient agrarian 2) moon festival goes on forever. Along the paddy 3) walls of the countryside and through teeming 4) lanes of towns, rich & poor 5) alike 6) gathered last week for family reunions 7) and celebrations....As another autumn moon lit up 8) the traditional festival, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek summoned his countrymen to rise against another kind of Tartar 9) in the national household. 10) 'We should understand,' he cried 11) in a broadcast to the people, 'that in addition to the treacherous rebels who are rampant 12) today, speculation, 13) manipulation 14) and high living 15) to the point of lasciviousness 16) on the part of social parasites 17) in our midst 18) are also to blame for our crisis....It is my intention to wash away these social dregs 19) by opening the floodgates of public conscience and social justice....' " 20)

1) **Come and go....go on forever:** a favorite means of expressing the long duration of an institution or object; probably began with "The Brook," a poem of Tennyson's, which has a refrain, "For men may come and men may go, But I go on forever."
2) **Agrarian:** pertaining to agriculture.
3) **Paddy:** from the Malay, padi. It has come to mean rice in general; thus, "paddy fields" are rice fields. As used above, "paddy walls" may refer to the dykes separating rice fields, or to terraces.
4) **Teeming:** originally meant bringing forth young; has now come to mean prolific, abounding; thus, "teeming lanes" are small streets filled with throngs of people.
5) **Rich & poor:** TIME Magazine uses the "ampersand" (&) in phrases of two words commonly linked by "and"; thus also, "young & old", "far & near", etc. Not generally used in this way.
6) **Alike:** both rich and poor.
7) **Family reunions:** a coming together of members of the family after a separation.
8) **As another autumn moon lit up....:** "As": at the time when; while. "Lit up": illuminated; but "up" unnecessary, although in common use, as in "light up the lamp." Where "light" means actually to set afire, it is used without "up".
9) **Another kind of Tartar:** the story had described the origin of the moon festival in the time of the Tartar invasion of China.
10) **National household:** "household" is a family dwelling-place; here used figuratively as the dwelling-place of all the people of China; the Tartar is made to seem more disagreeable by likening him to a burglar in the home.
11) **He cried:** meaning to be inferred from the context; as here, it means, "he stated vigorously"; "he shouted"; the other meaning is, "he wept."
12) **Rampant:** threatening and unrestrained in bearing.
13) **Speculation:** buying or selling with the expectation of profiting by fluctuations in price.
14) **Manipulation:** to force prices up or down; to rig.
15) **High living:** extravagant luxurious living.
16) **Lasciviousness:** wantonness, lewdness, lustfulness.
17) **Social parasites:** those who live upon society while not working and contributing themselves.
18) **In our midst:** among us.
19) **Social dregs:** the sediment, most worthless part of society.
20) **Opening the floodgates of public conscience and social justice:** "floodgates" here suggests that public conscience and social justice are like a mighty river, which, when the speaker has opened the sluices (floodgates), will sweep away the social dregs and other undesirables.

We received a letter from a reader in Nanking, suggesting several topics he would like to see treated in these Lessons. He mentions 1) exceptions to grammatical rules, 2) ideas on letter-writing, and 3) explanations of slang terms.

As this reader points out, "each grammatical rule leaks." We sympathize with him, but would put it slightly differently: to us, each grammatical rule seems like a small island in a sea of exceptions. We do not see much value in presenting a column or so of exceptions to grammatical "rules;" both rules and exceptions can be found in any English grammar book. We shall note such exceptions as occur in these Lessons, but the only way to master them is to familiarize oneself with English through reading, writing and speaking it as much as possible.

Regarding letter-writing, there are as many books on this subject as on grammar. However, if there seems to be enough interest in this topic, we shall be glad to give some space to it. The form of salutation and ending in personal and business correspondence is fairly well fixed, for convenience; this can be easily learned. But the content is the most important thing—and no amount of lessons can supply the student with what to say. Again, we recommend practice: writing letters to a friend, or to this department, asking for correction.

As to colloquial English, we try to point our colloquial usage in the chosen texts. But the best source for these items is our readers; we ask all of you to write us your queries concerning colloquial terms which you do not understand.

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

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